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This article jointly estimates price-cost mark-ups and union bargaining
power of manufacturing firms in France, Belgium and Chile. Our GMM
results provide strong evidence of price-cost mark-ups being under-
estimated when labour market imperfections are ignored, corresponding to
the omission of the part of product rents captured by the workers.
I. Introduction
The identification and estimation of imperfect com-
petition in the product market has received great
attention in the empirical industrial organisation
literature (see Breshnahan, 1989 and Schmalensee,
1989 for surveys). Likewise, the degree of labour
market imperfections has been explored extensively in
the empirical rent sharing literature (see e.g.
Blanchflower et al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald,
1997). However, there are few empirical studies (see
e.g. Schroeter, 1988; Bughin, 1996; Neven et al., 2002;
Dobbelaere, 2004) which consider the possible inter-
action between product market and labour market
imperfections when investigating price-cost mark-
ups. These studies do however not allow for
consistent comparisons as they rely on different
modelling frameworks and econometric techniques.
The contribution of this short article is (1) to
compare consistently joint estimates of price-cost
mark-ups and extent of rent sharing of manufactur-
ing firms in France, Belgium and Chile and (2) to
evaluate the effect of ignoring rent sharing on the
estimation of price-cost mark-ups in the three
countries. Methodologically, we follow Cre´pon-
Desplatz-Mairesse (1999, 2002). By embedding the
Efficient Bargaining model (McDonald and Solow,
1981) in a microeconomic version of Hall’s (1988)
framework, they derive a reduced-form equation.
Estimating this equation allows the identification of
several structural parameters. These parameters
concern the firm’s price-cost mark-up, the scale
elasticity and the workers’ bargaining power.
The main point of this article is that price-cost
mark-ups of French, Belgian as well as Chilean
manufacturing firms are systematically underesti-
mated when imperfect competition in the labour
market is ignored. This underestimation corresponds
to the omission of the part of product rents captured
by the workers.
II. Theoretical Framework
We start from a production function Qit¼itF(Lit,
Mit, Kit) , where i is a firm index, Q is output, t a time
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index, L is labour, M is material input, K is capital
and it ¼ Aeaiþatþuit , is an index of technical change
or ‘true’ total factor productivity. The function F is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree it.
1
Under imperfect competition in the product market
and perfect competition in the labour market,
the Solow Residual (Total factor productivity
conventionally measured) can be expressed as:
SRit¼qitLitlitMitmitð1LitMitÞkit
¼ðit1Þ Lit litkitð ÞþMit mitkitð Þ½ 
þðit1Þkitþit ð1Þ
with qit, lit, mit, kit and it the logarithms of Qit, Lit,
Mit, Kit and it. Jit¼ (PJit Jit)/(Pit Qit) (J¼L,M) are
the shares of labour and materials inputs in total
revenue. Equation 1 shows that the Solow Residual
can be decomposed into (1) a price-cost mark-up
component it¼Pit/CQ, it (where P denotes the
output price and CQ the marginal cost); (2) a scale
factor component with it being the scale elasticity
and (3) a technological change residual term
(it¼tþuit).
Embedding the Efficient Bargaining model2 into
the framework extends the expression for the Solow
Residual as follows:
SRit¼ðit  1Þ Lit lit kitð Þ þ Mit mit kitð Þ½ 
þ ðit  1Þkit þ it it
1 it Lit þ Mit  1ð Þ
 lit kitð Þ þit ð2Þ
This equation only differs from Equation 1 by an
additional term reflecting the workers’ bargaining
power it2 [0, 1].
III. Empirical Analysis
Reduced-form equations
Considering ,  and  as average
parameters, we can estimate the following reduced-
form equations:
SRit ¼ ð 1Þ Lit lit kitð Þ þ Mit mit kitð Þ½ 
þ ð 1Þkit þit ðIÞ
SRit ¼ ð 1Þ Lit lit kitð Þ þ Mit mit kitð Þ½ 
þ ð 1Þkit þ  
1  Lit þ Mit  1ð Þ
 lit kitð Þ þit ðIIÞ
SRit¼ 

1
 
Lit litkitð ÞþMit mitkitð Þ½ 
þ 

1
 
kitþ 1

 
qItþit ðICÞ
SRit¼ 

1
 
Lit litkitð ÞþMit mitkitð Þ½ 
þ 

1
 
kitþ 


1 LitþMit1ð Þ
 litkitð Þþ 1

 
qItþit ðIICÞ
(I) and (II) follow directly from the theoretical
framework.
Changes in output prices (pit) and hence in real
output (qit) are generally not observed at the firm
level. In empirical practice, changes in real output are
replaced by changes in nominal output (or sales) that
are deflated by a common industry price index pIt.
Ignoring output price differentials might lead to
downwardly biased and inconsistent estimates of the
parameters of interest if there are large differentials in
the firm output prices (across firms within industry)
and if these differentials are correlated with the
explanatory variables (changes in factor inputs and
factor shares). Equations (IC) and (IIC) control
for output price differentials, following the solution
suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996).3 This
solution results in modified regressions with the
growth in industry output (qIt) as an additional
regressor and a different interpretation of the
coefficients in terms of the average scale elasticity
and parameter  and , and two mark-up
1For technical details, see Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002).
2 Cre´pon et al. (1999) and Dobbelaere (2004) adopt a different formulation of the bargaining model. They assume that the
firm has to bear both the costs of capital and the costs of materials in its fall-back position. The firm’s objective is to maximize
its short run profit defined as total revenue minus labour costs: RitwitLit. In this article, we follow Cre´pon et al. (2002) and
assume that the short run profit of the firm is value added minus labour costs: Ritjit Mitwit Lit The firm has only to cover
capital costs in its fall-back position.
3 The Klette-Griliches solution relies on the assumption that the market power of firms mainly arises from product
differentiation. In a differentiated product market, the firm market share depends on its relative price within the industry, and
hence the change in the firm relative price (PitPIt) can be expressed in terms of its output growth relative to the industry
(qitqIt). See also Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005).
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parameters:  capturing a specific demand mark-up
associated with the within-industry demand elasticity
, where ¼ /(1), and the average general mark-
up , corresponding also to other forms of product
market imperfections.
Data
To estimate the four reduced-form Equations (I), (II),
(IC) and (IIC) for France, we use a balanced
panel of 1026 manufacturing firms over the period
1986 to 1992. This sample has been constructed from
the database SUSE (‘Syste`me Unife´ des Statistiques
d’Entreprises’) of INSEE, the French National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies. For
Belgium, we rely on an unbalanced panel of 5565
firms in the manufacturing industry over the period
1988 to 1995. The data are taken from company
accounts which are collected by the NBB (National
Bank of Belgium). For Chile, we have a balanced
panel of 1954 manufacturing firms over the period
1993 to 1999; it is largely drawn from the ENIA
(‘la Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual’) which is
gathered by the INE (‘el Instituto de Estadı´sticas de
Chile’). Table 1 reports the means and the SDs of the
included data for our main variables. The definitions
of these variables are practically the same in the three
countries.4
Estimation method and main results
Since changes in factor inputs (l, m and k) are
endogenous to our model and since these changes can
be affected by past and current productivity shocks
(and demand shocks through the specification error
due to unobserved firm level output prices), Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the reduced-form
coefficients and the corresponding structural esti-
mates are likely to be biased and inconsistent. To
avoid such biases and to take into account endo-
geneity problems, we estimate Equations (I)–(II–C)
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
technique. More specifically, we use interior variables
(lagged values of the growth of the input factors l,
m and k) as instruments. To capture possible
unobservable aggregate shocks and productivity
shocks common to all firms in a given year, we
include time dummies.
Since our focus is on the magnitude of the
underlying structural parameters (, ,  and )
and on assessing the differences which result from
modelling imperfect competition in both the product
and the labour market in the three different countries,
we present in Table 2 the structural parameters.
These are computed from the estimated values of the
reduced-form coefficients. For all reported results, we
can never reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid on the basis of the Sargan test.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
First, the parameter of average degree of rent sharing
 is estimated precisely and robustly across the
specifications. The estimates point to a statistically
significant workers’ bargaining power of 0.66
(France), 0.36 (Belgium) and 0.31 (Chile) on a scale
going from 0 to 1, indicating a high degree of rent
sharing. Second, in the three countries, the lack of
explicit consideration of labour market imperfections
results in an underestimation of the average price-cost
mark-up, corresponding to the omission of the part
of rents captured by the workers. When taking into
account the existence of rent sharing and controlling
Table 1. Summary Statistics
France 1986–1992
(N¼ 1026)
Belgium 1988–1995
(N¼ 5565)
Chile 1993–1999
(N¼ 1954)
Variables Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Real firm output growth rate q 0.028 (0.203) 0.047 (0.177) 0.011 (0.282)
Real industry output growth rate qInd 0.024 (0.041) 0.046 (0.168) 0.013 (0.118)
Labour growth rate l 0.002 (0.151) 0.020 (0.142) 0.008 (0.221)
Capital growth rate k 0.039 (0.208) 0.009 (0.253) 0.016 (0.179)
Materials growth rate m 0.037 (0.248) 0.048 (0.221) 0.022 (0.396)
Labour share L in nominal output 0.267 (0.130) 0.272 (0.138) 0.150 (0.087)
Materials share M in nominal output 0.612 (0.145) 0.587 (0.160) 0.533 (0.163)
Solow residual SR (TFP) 0.002 (0.082) 0.014 (0.084) 0.005 (0.197)
Note: SR¼qitLit litMitmit(1LitMit)kit.
4 For detailed information on the sample construction and the variable measurement, we refer to Cre´pon et al. (2002),
Dobbelaere (2004) and Contreras and Benavente (2006), respectively.
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for output price differentials, the average profit ratio
(/) increases from 1.11 to 1.41 (France), 1.14 to
1.29 (Belgium) and 1.35 to 1.65 (Chile). For the three
countries, this increase is due to a rise in the estimated
average mark-up  and a decline in the estimated
scale elasticity .5 Third, controlling for price
heterogeneity leads to a sizeable increase in the
average mark-up and the scale elasticity of French
and Chilean manufacturing firms and a small increase
in both parameters of Belgian manufacturing
firms. Taking into consideration the problem of
price heterogeneity does however not modify our
assessment of the magnitude of the average profit
ratio (/). Finally, the results suggest that the mark-
up of French and Chilean manufacturing firms is
mainly a differentiated product or demand mark-up.
In contrast, it seems that the main source of market
power of Belgian manufacturing firms is not in
product differentiation but rather corresponds to
other forms of imperfect competition.
IV. Conclusion
This article compares in a consistent way joint
estimates of imperfections in both the product and
the labour market in three different countries, i.e.
France, Belgium and Chile, and evaluates the effect of
ignoring labour market imperfections on the estima-
tion of the price-cost mark-up. For the three countries,
the empirical analysis shows clearly that the lack of
explicit consideration of labour market imperfections
results ina considerable underestimationof theaverage
price-cost mark-up, corresponding to the omission of
the part of firm rents captured by the workers. The
average workers’ bargaining power is estimated at 0.66
(France), 0.36 (Belgium) and 0.31 (Chile), while our
estimate of the average price-cost mark-up is about
1.42 (France), 1.24 (Belgium) and 1.28 (Chile).
Ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing reduces the
price-cost mark-up to 1.23 (France), 1.21 (Belgium)
and 1.18 (Chile). A key implication of our results is that
wages should not be considered exogenous in econo-
metric tests of product market power.
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